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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the processes that bring about the creation of new public-space CCTV schemes. 
Through an appraisal of the grounded activities of the practitioners who make decisions over CCTV, the role 
of agency is identified as a particularly strong, yet relatively neglected, influence on its implementation. 
Moreover, beyond dichotomised notions of central  structures and local agency, an understanding is 
developed of the complex interaction between the individual actors involved in CCTV dissemination and the 
political context in which they operate. In doing so, public policy is identified as the vehicle through which 
camera surveillance systems become installed and disseminated throughout public space. Moreover, these 
various forces of structure and agency become filtered through identifiable networks of policy-makers, 
comprising ‘responsibilised’ actors who oversee the deployment of CCTV. This analysis is used to revisit a 
range of administrative and theoretical understandings of surveillance, including: citations of CCTV as an 
evaluated response to crime; the attribution of power- and interest-based agendas to its implementation; and 
accounts which locate CCTV expansion within various evolving societal processes. Drawing on qualitative 
fieldwork data gathered during doctoral research, the paper considers the activities of practitioners at a local 
level and identifies crucial contexts, drivers and negotiations on which expanding surveillance is contingent. 
Ultimately, it is argued that the process of CCTV installation – from conception to material implementation – 
is disrupted and mediated by a range of micro-level operations, obligations, processes, managerial concerns 
(particularly conflict resolution and resource issues), structures and agency, and the indirect influence of 
central government. These not only arbitrate over whether the CCTV becomes installed, but also generate a 
range of additional uses for the cameras, many of which are performed before they are even switched on. 
This emphasises the need to consider the processes that enable and constrain the actions of those making 
decisions over CCTV and demonstrates how no single interest becomes solely participant in the deployment 
of surveillance. Finally, because of the centrality and contingency of both human agency and the structural 
contexts in which it operates in determining the installation of CCTV, questions arise concerning the 
importance of integrative sociological theories in understanding the deployment of surveillance. 
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Introduction 
 
Surveillance is by no means a new phenomenon. Historical accounts, for instance, cite 
embedded surveillance practices operating in the control of the Athenian Agora and the Roman 
Forum (Sennett, 1990). However, over more recent years, surveillance has become a central 
feature of contemporary society (Lyon, 2001). What is different about contemporary 
manifestations of surveillance is its recent growth through technological developments  – 
ultimately generating novel means and forms of data extraction and mechanisms for controlling 
crime and disorder  – culminating in new and shifting interactions between surveillance 
technology and society. However, it has been the explosion of CCTV surveillance cameras onto 
British streets since the early 1990s that has been perhaps the most politicised, recognisable and 
commented-upon manifestation of this technological expansion of surveillance. British citizens 
now experience the most intensive public camera scrutiny in the world (Graham et al., 1996; 
The Independent, 2004), where Londoners can expect to be filmed by, on average, around 
300 cameras a day (Norris and Armstrong, 1999).  
 
Through an empirical examination of the grounded activities of the individuals who oversee the 
deployment of CCTV, this paper seeks to examine some of the mechanisms and processes that 
lead to the dissemination of these surveillance strategies across the UK. Before doing so, this 
paper first offers a brief review of some of the thematic ways in which such technological 
surveillance has been understood.  
 
 
Theorising CCTV 
 
This proliferation of technological surveillance has hardly gone unnoticed and the functionality of 
CCTV has been understood in a variety of ways; through applied and theoretical standpoints 
alike. Taking a general view of this literature, Fyfe (2004) notes an increasing tendency for 
utopian and dystopian discourses to prevail in such debates. Indeed, the utopian label has 
regularly been applied, often with good reason, to practitioners’ and politicians’ claims that 
CCTV could provide the solution to rising rates of criminality during the early to mid-1990s. 
However, since then, evidence of a more nuanced and realistic understanding of its capabilities 
is beginning to emerge in administrative circles (inter alia Welsh and Farrington, 2002).  
 
Many critical sociological approaches to surveillance – and CCTV in particular – emphasise the 
‘dystopian’ side of the coin and have drawn heavily on prominent and recurring themes. For 
instance, Haggerty and Ericson (2000: 605), Hier (2003), Williams and Johnstone (2000) and 
Lyon (1994) all note the dominance of Orwellian and Foucauldian paradigms within the field of 
surveillance studies. Others, such as Newburn and Hayman (2001), stress a tendency to 
describe CCTV in terms of a ‘maximum surveillance society’ (see Norris and Armstrong, 1999) 
or ‘Big Brother’ (Davies, 1996a). Recently, commentators have also observed the prominence 
(Webster, 2004) or over-representation (Coleman, 2004) of work seeking to understand 
CCTV through Foucault’s (Benthamite) metaphor of the P anopticon as a blueprint for the 
network of unrelenting observation underpinning the wider dispersal of societal control. Fussey: An Interrupted Transmission? 
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Similarly, Fussey (2004) notes the prominence of neo-Marxist and Foucauldian theoretical 
groundings in many accounts of surveillance, whilst Bogard (1996) adds Weber to this binary. 
 
However, critical examinations of surveillance have proliferated in recent years and generated a 
range of interesting and important theoretical approaches. One particularly influential and 
growing body of work, for example, implicates CCTV in the sorting of gendered, racialised or 
socio–economic ‘difference’ in late-modern urban spaces ( inter alia Seabrook and Wattis, 
2001; Norris and Armstrong, 1999; Davis, 1998 respectively). Paralleling urban geographical 
themes of divisive space (see Soja, 1989), this latter theme of socio-economic difference has 
been critically examined as a process by which economically powerful groups in society gain 
power through the private management of public space, a transition characterised by some as a 
subtle form of privatisation of public space (Graham et al., 1996). This development has been 
similarly described as fostering the emergence of ‘neoliberal spaces’ (Brenner and Theodore, 
2002), whereby an individual’s capacity for consumption influences access to zones of formerly 
public space. For many commentators, CCTV has been a complicit tool in ordering and policing 
this division between potential consumers and non-consumers in late-modern urban spaces 
(inter alia Beck and Willis, 1995; Bannister et al., 1998; Coleman and Sim, 1998, 2000; 
Norris and Armstrong, 1999; Williams et al., 2000; Toon, 2000; McCahill, 2002; Fyfe, 2004) 
and its ubiquity in commercial centres is perhaps testament to this. Such developments have also 
connected with varying reflections on late-modern (re)configurations of governance (inter alia 
Coleman, 2004; McCahill, 2002; Norris and McCahill, 2006). 
 
Although the above themes represent a sizable portion of ‘surveillance theory’, other theoretical 
positions have sought to develop and build on Foucault’s work. Here, the work of Giles 
Deleuze (1995) has gained particular ascendancy, chiefly in reference to his conceptualisation of 
‘societies of control’; a condition that supersedes Foucault’s disciplinary society. Continuing 
Foucault’s theme of the ubiquity of power, Deleuze characterises a paradoxical co-existence of 
greater control alongside its reduced physical tangibility. Such control is thus exercised though 
illimitable and unending ‘modulation’ as opposed to Foucauldian depictions of ‘moulding’ into a 
specific ‘normalised’ form (Deleuze, 1995: 179). In the most explicit adaptation of Deleuzian 
‘control’ into explanations of surveillance, Haggerty and Ericson (2000) note the convergence of 
control and surveillance systems, specifically through the development of ‘surveillant 
assemblages’. Briefly, these assemblages capture various information flows and re-assemble 
them into observable phenomena. In conceptualising the lack of institutional boundaries of such 
assemblages, Haggerty and Ericson forward the concept of ‘rhizomatic surveillance’ which 
incorporates a central feature of expansion. This expansion refers to the exponential growth of 
surveillance which both subsumes new technology and systems whilst simultaneously drawing 
existing surveillant forms into assemblages. 
 
Whilst these theoretical arguments clearly have a great deal to offer, much of the emphasis is 
orientated around the functionality of surveillance once installed and operational. This paper, 
however, examines what happens in order for surveillance provisions to become deployed in the 
first instance, thus examining some of the complex processes surrounding and leading to 
implementation of CCTV. Moreover, many (though clearly not all) of the above descriptions of 
the  operation  of CCTV harbour an implicit suggestion that surveillance is  installed  – or Fussey: An Interrupted Transmission? 
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expands  – to reflect particular agendas (for example malign corporate intent) or evolving 
processes (such as wider shifts towards societies of control). This paper conceptualises this 
process as one of a ‘transmission’ from concept to manifest CCTV implementation.  
 
Moreover, the transmission of CCTV from concept to practice remains an underdeveloped 
theme, as investigations into the implementation of public surveillance cameras constitute an 
under-populated region in the burgeoning field surveillance studies. One notable exception, 
however, is Graham’s (1998) examination of the growth of CCTV surveillance to become what 
he describes as a ‘fifth utility’ in Britain’s urban environments alongside electricity, gas, water 
and telecommunications. Here, Graham argues that CCTV implementation is propelled by the 
combination of ‘supply push’ and ‘demand pull’ factors. Regarding the former, powerful local 
coalitions – incorporating  elements from the media, the police, local authorities, commercial 
interests, insurance companies and, perhaps most significantly, the surveillance ‘industrial 
complex’ (including CCTV manufacturers, ICT companies, private security firms, 'consultants' 
and other service providers)  - generate an irresistible drive for the implementation of public 
space surveillance cameras. For Graham, this intersects with a ‘demand pull’ from 
(methodologically flawed) polls of a public seemingly unconcerned over issues of privacy and 
civil liberties (and, one might add, the many l imitations of CCTV) given the prospect of 
increased 'security'. Once installed, CCTV then follows an ‘expansionary logic’ where it makes 
sense to incorporate unobserved areas into surveillance networks.  
 
Such observations raise many interesting questions  regarding how such influences spur the 
installation of CCTV. For example, how do particular supply ‘interests’ gain primacy? Given the 
diverse occupational cultures behind the development of crime control strategies (inter alia, 
Sampson et al., 1988; Crawford, 1998), what happens if conflicts and disagreements arise 
within such coalitions? How is discord negotiated? Likewise, does public demand simply 
become transmitted into manifest strategies? If so, whose demands are articulated and which 
mechanisms allow them to become galvanised? 
 
This paper argues that surveillance neither operates nor is it implemented within a vacuum. 
Instead, myriad direct and indirect influences can be identified as exerting themselves on – and 
propelling  – public CCTV implementation from its conception as a policy decision, to its 
manifestation on Britain’s streets.  Furthermore, it argues that ‘messy’ arrangements and non-
uniform assertions of human agency impacting on the creation of CCTV strategies mean that 
there is still much to learn about this process of ‘transmission’ as it relates to CCTV. Such 
recognition of agency, it is argued, may also serve to supplement and facilitate reflection on 
many of the existing accounts of surveillance discussed above.  
 
To understand such processes, this paper acknowledges the recent and growing  body of 
literature identifying the need to understand technology and surveillance through recognition of its 
wider political and social contexts alongside what happens locally (inter alia Graham and 
Marvin, 1996; Lyon, 2001; McCahill, 2002). This need is responded to here through an 
examination of the micro-level processes and, crucially, applications of agency which shape the 
implementation of public-space CCTV systems. However, this attention to local action does not Fussey: An Interrupted Transmission? 
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constitute an exclusive emphasis. Instead, the manner in which external forces interact with local 
activity is also recognised as an important site of analysis. 
 
To develop a conceptual framework allowing for a nuanced understanding of the complex 
interplay between individual agency and the social environment in which surveillance strategies 
are formulated, Lyon’s (2002) argument concerning the profound interconnectivity between the 
study of surveillance and of policy analysis is acknowledged. Taking Lyon’s comment as a 
starting point, public policy is identified as the vehicle through which open street camera 
surveillance systems become installed and disseminated throughout society. Moreover, these 
various forces of structure and agency become filtered through identifiable networks of policy-
makers, comprising responsibilised actors (Garland, 1996) who oversee the deployment of 
CCTV.1 
 
Specifically, these identifiable networks are coalesced into community safety partnerships which 
have been formalised, and in many cases established, since the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act 
(CDA). Under this legislation, these partnerships are given the responsibility to generate crime 
control strategies in their particular locations in the UK. Hence, these are argued to be the 
location where crucial decisions are made regarding the implementation and dissemination of 
public CCTV surveillance and its application in particular roles. Political pressures and public 
demands to install CCTV, the assertion of practitioner knowledge concerning its effectiveness 
and the generation of funding for their installation are all filtered through such partnerships. These 
forums therefore constitute the site where the transmission of CCTV policy is interrupted, 
shaped and modulated. 
 
The following findings are presented in a form which acknowledges Graham’s (1998: 90) notion 
of ‘supply–push’ and ‘demand–pull’ pressures upon CCTV. Here, this typology is used as a 
lens by which to view a broad range of differing influences empirically identified as asserting 
themselves upon the processes that govern CCTV installation. Moreover, because of the 
unpredictable impact of human agency on such processes, the analysis then examines the role of 
partnerships as conduits in which competing pressures and beliefs concerning CCTV and its 
capabilities are contested and negotiated.  Before discussing these findings, this paper will now 
outline the methodological apparatus employed for the collection of data. 
 
 
                                                  
1 This process of ‘responsibilisation’ relates to Garland’s (1996) observation that state authority for 
protecting the public and, hence, developing and implemented anti-crime strategies was becoming devolved 
onto (responsibilised) local-level actors. The extent of this deputation constitutes a much-debated issue 
amongst criminologists (see inter alia Garland, 2001 and, with specific reference to CCTV, inter alia 
Coleman, 2004; Fussey, 2004). Fussey: An Interrupted Transmission? 
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Methodology 
 
A combination of qualitative methodologies were employed to examine the perceptions and 
practices of responsibilised agents involved in generating crime control strategies, including 
CCTV, working within post-CDA crime and disorder partnerships in two different English 
urban areas. During the fieldwork, CCTV systems were at various stages of development 
across both partnerships – ranging from proposals for new systems to the upgrading of existing 
networks. As such, the intention of this paper is to ascertain the myriad influences impacting 
upon such CCTV policy processes. 
 
Site Selection 
 
These sites were selected according to a number of criteria relating to variations in the 
composition of the different partnerships and urban contexts they operate within. Here, two case 
studies were chosen: Industrial Town and Metropolitan City. 
 
By UK standards, Metropolitan City is a reasonably large city with a population in excess of 
300, 000 people. Once thriving and famed for its manufacturing industries – and also once host 
to one of the UK’s most important sub-cultural music scenes – Metropolitan City experienced 
significant socio-economic decline following a period of de-industrialisation during the 1980s 
and 1990s; a process that has left some areas of the city amongst the most deprived in the 
country. Such areas were also the sites of major public disorder during the 1980s. Perhaps 
intrinsically linked to such issues, Metropolitan City has been at the forefront of many crime 
prevention initiatives, including CCTV. CCTV was first installed here during 1988, when nine 
cameras were set up to monitor covered pedestrian walkways in the city centre. The CCTV 
network was then substantially upgraded in 1991 by another 49 (city-centre) cameras. Over a 
decade later, during the time of research, this figure had doubled, with more than 120 cameras 
surveying the city. During this period of fieldwork, the systems were being upgraded once more 
and also rolled-out into residential areas of the city. 
 
By contrast, Industrial Town is a much smaller location with a population of around 100, 000 
residents. Once focused around local engineering and manufacturing, Industrial Town is now 
experiencing expansion in the service and leisure industries. The crime control partnership was 
only recently developed in 1999, following statutory obligations imposed by the CDA. This 
marks an interesting distinction between the sites and provides potentially fruitful ground for the 
analysis of the processes, initiatives and the influence of Home Office directives on local 
partnerships.2  CCTV was first introduced into Industrial Town during 1995. At the time of 
research, the network incorporated 64 Pan, Tilt and Zoom (PTZ) cameras and had recently 
introduced three mobile camera units for flexible deployment; roughly half the public-space 
cameras of Metropolitan City. Again, cameras were beginning to be disseminated into the 
town’s residential spaces. 
                                                  
2 The UK Home Office is a major government department, which, amongst other functions, is charged with 
generating and delivering crime control policy (although also see endnote 1).  As of May 2007, the 
department will become divided whereby its criminal justice functions will be relocated to a new ‘Ministry of 
Justice’. Fussey: An Interrupted Transmission? 
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Sampling and Data Collection Tools 
 
In doing so, a purposive (non-probability) sampling approach was employed to select the 
potential  participants of research enquiry based on a particular characteristic (inter alia May, 
2001), in this case, membership of one of the crime control partnerships. Thirty-nine semi-
structured interviews3 were initially conducted, which combined with follow-up interviews and 
discussions culminated in around 60 hours of research data. These were supplemented with 
more informal face-to-face, telephone and email conversations (used to clarify and test the 
validity of emerging themes) and also complemented with an  analysis of documents depicting 
policy decisions, published reports, community consultation exercises, minuted meetings and 
CCTV funding applications. Key research methods are now discussed in greater detail. 
 
The interviews covered a range of different agencies representing diverse interests, for example, 
from the police to representatives from the voluntary and private sectors. Because hierarchical 
structures and lead agencies affecting CCTV policy processes were not immediately obvious 
prior to engagement with the research field, snowball sampling techniques were adopted. This 
helped to identify key players in the development of CCTV strategies and subsequently allowed 
their contributions to be accented according. Generally speaking, the central actors and lead 
agencies were revealed to be local authorities and the police as they usually (although not 
exclusively) presided over the generation of crime control responses, orchestrated public 
consultation exercises, brokered the ‘knowledge’ for possible strategies and organised their 
funding. Of those participants quoted in the findings below, each either exerted a significant 
influence on the development of actual and proposed CCTV schemes or was well-placed to 
describe particular processes. Their particular role and influence is stated as their contributions 
are introduced. 
 
All interviews (with one exception) were recorded and then fully transcribed. This was done to 
facilitate a more thorough examination of statements, reduce bias and help avoid the ‘intuitive 
gloss’ (Heritage, 1984: 238) researchers may add to respondents’ actions. The transcribed data 
was then analysed inductively to identify significant and emerging themes and then re-examined 
in a more systematic manner to assess whether others reflected such issues. For example, some 
practitioners’ descriptions of non-technological surveillance (see below) became a key theme 
once their interconnection to CCTV was flagged in later interviews. Once its significance was 
understood, the data could then be re-visited for evidence of this previously overlooked theme 
amongst the testimony of other participants. The quotations presented below are indicative of 
these themes. 
 
Aside from the informal interactions with participants mentioned above, the research interviews 
were also supplemented with documentary sources. These took two forms: documents obtained 
from central government and those from local sources pertaining to the work of local 
partnerships. The former were analysed to establish the government’s stance in relation to 
                                                  
3 Because partnerships are shaped by local agency and negotiated realities, data was needed to reflect how 
practitioners saw their work, thus informing the decision to employ qualitative semi-structured interviews 
(SSIs). Moreover, SSIs were deemed appropriate as they would allow latitude for probing and theme 
development during the interview setting whilst retaining a degree of comparability across the data. Fussey: An Interrupted Transmission? 
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CCTV and how these formed recommendations for local networks. Additionally, central 
government requirements for the formations of the local structures where decisions over CCTV 
were taken were also examined. Typical government documents used included the Home Office 
‘toolkits’ for action on given problems of crime, particularly in relation to where the government 
perceived that CCTV was best deployed; Home Office advice on bidding for CCTV funding; 
and also guidelines, obligations and advice regarding the formation and operation of the 
partnerships themselves, as forums for where decisions for the deployment of strategies such as 
CCTV are taken. 
 
Local documentation outlined partnerships’ agreed aims, objectives and strategic 
decisions, which illustrate trends in policy-making, broad approaches to crime control 
and their underpinning theoretical basis. Typical sources of information for this type 
of data were the annual action plans produced by each partnership. Local 
documentation was also employed to ascertain how local practitioners interpreted and 
responded to Home Office requirements, an issue that was particularly clear in the 
documents submitted to the government for CCTV funding. Another important local 
documentary source were the crime and disorder audits carried out every three years 
(a mandatory obligation under the CDA). These highlight what problems are 
perceived in the particular locality, key issues on which strategies are based whilst also 
indicating the orientation of both partnerships. Finally, minutes of partnership 
meetings were drawn upon to corroborate the key actors and agencies driving CCTV 
policy along 
 
 
Introducing the findings 
 
Many of the theoretical positions discussed above are contrasted by official discourses which 
stress a narrow and supposedly objective rational (and hence benign) approach towards CCTV 
implementation. Here, CCTV is said to be installed in response to an application of the most 
effective strategy based on evaluated evidence of ‘what works’ in responding to an identified 
problem of crime and/or disorder; an approach also articulated as a 
scanning/analysis/response/assessment’ model (SARA). Notwithstanding the extreme difficulties 
in quantifying such a breadth of social life into measurable criteria whilst simultaneously gathering 
sufficient methodologically robust data to adequately know ‘what works’ in given contexts, 
recourse to evaluative studies was conspicuously absent in both partnerships. Moreover, co-
ordinators of both partnerships stressed a  more ad-hoc and flexible set of arrangements 
governing crime control policy-making. As such, this paper acknowledges criticisms regarding 
the over-determinism of administrative approaches (McCahill and Norris, 2002) and argues that 
such claims of CCTV as a rationally-contrived response to evaluated induces of crime ignore the 
more uneven and extraneous influences affecting practitioners working in grounded policy 
contexts.  
 
Moreover, such influences can be broadly characterised within the sociological heuristic of 
agency and structure. In terms of agency, complicit practitioners receive and mediate the various Fussey: An Interrupted Transmission? 
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demand and supply forces driving CCTV and imprint their own interpretations during the 
transmission of CCTV policy from idea to manifest strategy. This agency also acts in relation to 
influential structural factors including: the tension between central and local government, the 
formulation and stratification of local structures, post-CDA policy-making arrangements stressing 
consultation (which raise  the profile of low-level disorder, particularly in residential areas), 
legitimating obligations remedied through the tangible symbolism of CCTV and managerial 
considerations, comprising time and money resource issues and the need to secure consensus 
within a diverse partnership.  
 
To examine such impositions of agency and structure in more detail, this paper now presents the 
empirical findings in relation to the supply-side and demand-driven drivers for CCTV and, 
finally, the way in which such forces become negotiated within partnership settings. 
 
 
Supplying surveillance 
 
Contrary to assertions made in other work in this area (inter alia; Graham, 1998), within these 
partnerships, no evidence was found of pressure from CCTV manufacturers to install their 
product in the public sphere. This is caused by a number of factors largely concerning the 
processes occurring before such decisions can be made. For example, as following discussions 
show, public and political pressure for CCTV is significant enough to strongly influence the 
decision to pursue the implementation of public surveillance cameras.  For such reasons, 
practitioners understandably see CCTV as an attractive tool.4 However, one overwhelmingly 
significant factor facilitating the supply of CCTV consistently pointed to by practitioners was the 
existence of available Home Office funding earmarked for CCTV implementation. 
 
Because securing the resources for the installation of CCTV is a key factor determining whether 
the systems are actually implemented, it is necessary to briefly consider how this occurs and 
what its effects are. In doing so, an argument is forwarded that the way in which cash resources 
are obtained and the conditions imposed on the dissemination of funds have sizable implications 
for how CCTV policy is formulated and subsequently implemented. Such issues also reflect on a 
number of theoretical approaches, particularly concerning governance and CCTV, although 
these have been examined in more detail elsewhere (inter alia Fussey, 2004). 
 
The main source of funding for CCTV schemes is from the annual Home Office CCTV 
Initiative. As an indication of its size, the first Home Office CCTV Initiative – replacing the 
earlier CCTV Challenge Scheme in 1999 as part of the government’s Crime Reduction 
Programme – made £153 million available from 1999 to March, 2002 (Home Office, 2001). In 
practice, the capital (installation and initial set-up) costs for all new public CCTV schemes in 
both partnerships was supplied by the Home Office, whereas day-to-day management costs are 
met locally. The other potentially significant sources of CCTV funding are the Single 
Regeneration Budget (SRB) and the local council, although in both partnerships these alternative 
                                                  
4 Additionally, no evidence was found of mechanisms for private companies to meaningfully lobby 
practitioners. Fussey: An Interrupted Transmission? 
Surveillance & Society 4(3) 
 
238 
sources were barely significant by comparison. Moreover, the reliance on Home Office funding 
is so great that if a bid collapses, CCTV systems are not implemented. This has occurred on a 
number of occasions in both partnerships (Interviews 1, 15 and 35).5 
 
However, gaining cash resources from the Home Office is  a complex affair involving strict 
criteria and adherence to specific processes. In particular, the central government can be seen to 
use its control of funding to both influence local agendas and to affect which strategies are 
applied. Yet it is important to note that this does not necessarily mean a simple transmission of 
state values into the local sphere; practitioner agency retains a crucial influence on the 
dissemination of strategies such as CCTV (see below). As many studies have shown, local 
managers often add their own interpretations to those policies made at the top (inter alia 
Crowther, 2000). Nevertheless, the influence of government funding criteria on local practices is 
also an implicit theme in the following discussions. 
 
The supply of surveillance in different spaces 
 
Examination of the drivers behind CCTV implementation also identifies important differences 
between different types of urban spaces, particularly between residential and central commercial 
areas. Whilst urban centres were largely saturated with CCTV cameras by the mid 1990s 
(Graham et al., 1996), their expansion into residential contexts has been slower. However, the 
turn of the millennium marked a change in policy whereby areas of greater residential density 
became the new sites of CCTV expansion. Of the funds made available by the government at 
this time, around half are allocated for this purpose (Home Office, 2000a, 2000b). Indeed, both 
research sites had also begun to disseminate CCTV into residential areas since the early years of 
this decade. Because of substantial differences between the implementation of CCTV depending 
on its central or residential location, this expansion is significant at both practical and theoretical 
levels. This is because CCTV strategies are fostered by differing drivers, aims and applications 
dependent on location. For example, CCTV implementation in residential areas appears to be 
more driven by public pressure and opinion (often in response to experienced ‘environmental 
incivilities’), rather than solely the interests of business. This is exacerbated through increased 
population density in residential spaces and post-CDA requirements for public consultations as 
a basis for strategies. Whereas interest-based and political-economic accounts of CCTV 
expansion have been quick to point to the role of corporate interests in the lobbying for CCTV, 
this is clearly less pronounced in urban residential areas. Ultimately, this signifies the importance 
of recognising specificity and sensitivity to its situational contexts when conceptualising CCTV 
installation processes. This also represents the need to draw boundaries around the applicability 
of such corporate interest-based explanations of CCTV within wider urban geographies. 
 
                                                  
5 Interview 1 was conducted with the overall co-ordinator for crime control strategies within the Industrial 
Town partnership. The participant for Interview 15 occupied a similar role covering a north-eastern region of 
Metropolitan City. The head Police representative to the Metropolitan City partnership was questioned in 
Interview 35. Fussey: An Interrupted Transmission? 
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Human Mediation and the Commitment to Surveillance 
 
Surveillance cameras are not only supplied into differential spaces, but are also located within 
varying strategic contexts. One of the significant recent changes in Home Office funding criteria 
involves the requirement that CCTV must be installed alongside a raft of other preventative 
measures. During the 1990s, for example, practitioners could submit successful funding bids 
whereby CCTV was the sole strategy (provided there was public support and available funding 
to meet maintenance costs). Now, however, there was recognition that bids would only be 
deemed credible provided CCTV is implemented alongside potentially complementary 
measures; thus located within a strategic context. This change is significant for a number of 
reasons. In the first instance, this (state and local) insistence that CCTV must be combined with 
other strategies represents an acknowledgement that CCTV is no longer the panacea, ‘silver 
bullet’ (inter alia Davies, 1996b) or all-encompassing ‘technofix’ it was perhaps once thought 
to be; thus indicating a growing awareness of its limitations.6 The fact that this position has 
changed also points to the need to recognise the contingency of CCTV expansion on the 
prevailing attitudes of the time. Because the attitudes of human actors change, this signifies the 
need for explanations of CCTV dissemination to recognise the specificity of time as well as 
place.  
 
Typically, these polystrategic packages combined CCTV with variants on neighbourhood 
wardens (‘CCTV on legs’ according to one practitioner),  ‘shop-watch’ and ‘pub-watch’  
schemes involving reporting of suspicious persons to other businesses in an area, radio links, 
Neighbourhood Watch and enhanced street lighting provisions. All of these centre on aspects of 
increased visibility, observation or monitoring capabilities. Ultimately, this not only represents 
confidence in such solutions, but also signifies an orientation of strategy around the goal of 
increased surveillance provisions whereby CCTV is a major feature. 
 
Hence, whilst a clear commitment towards increasing surveillance is evident in new crime-
control strategies, CCTV is increasingly complemented by informal, less technological and 
human forms of observation and integration. Thus, wider commitments to surveillance do not 
necessarily denote the endorsement of technological forms. This theme also raises two 
theoretical points. In the first instance, this reflects on Haggerty and Ericson’s (2000) depiction 
of a converging surveillance assemblage where technology is reproduced and increasingly 
networked with the aim of solving social problems. Whilst they acknowledge the role of human 
actors in the wider assemblage, they argue that where technology has yet to link surveillance 
systems together, human contact points are used as a substitute. Within this context, however, a 
paradoxical process is also in evidence where solely technological solutions are now becoming 
supplemented by the human agent. This reinstatement of the human agent into informal 
surveillance networks may also engender a high degree of inefficiency and unpredictability, as 
McCahill (2002) notes in relation to the ‘human web’ of CCTV observers.  
 
                                                  
6 Installing CCTV alongside other measures also makes it more difficult to assert that any reductions in crime 
are solely attributable to the cameras. Fussey: An Interrupted Transmission? 
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This marriage of CCTV and low-tech human networks of surveillance also suggests that, whilst 
many practitioners have a degree of faith in the ability of CCTV, they are not entirely (and 
passively) seduced by discourses of technology. Rather, faith in this particular technology is 
grounded in complex practical settings and ideological attitudes which help to stimulate its 
expansion. It is not necessarily because they are technological in themselves that they are 
supported, but potentially because such strategies incorporate ideas that find harmony with 
deeper beliefs regarding appropriate responses to crime. For practitioners in this context, 
CCTV embodies ideas that have attained status in both partnerships, including operational 
enforcement, and administrative notions of rational choice theory and ‘capable guardianship’. 
Such approaches also meet the defined partnership aims of tackling incivilities and promoting 
community sentiment. These intersect with contextual circumstances which constrain the 
opportunities for alternatives whilst generating mechanisms which favour CCTV implementation. 
Other technologies, such as electronic tagging, by contrast, may not have the same appeal (and 
hence strength of ‘technological discourse’) because they have an operational grounding which 
is at variance with popularity of this type of control. 
 
Latent utility and ‘presurveillance’ 
The fact that practitioners perceive CCTV as being capable of fulfilling a number of tasks is 
perhaps unsurprising. Indeed, a cursory glance at Home Office advice on crime control that is 
disseminated to practitioners in the form of ‘toolkits’ cites CCTV as a crucial recommended 
‘evaluated option’ to tackle the following disparate range of offences: 
 
•  ‘vehicle crime’ 
• ‘street crime and robbery’ 
• ‘burglary’ 
•  ‘anti-social behaviour’ 
• ‘rural crime’ 
• ‘transport’ 
• ‘race crime and harassment’ 
• ‘communities against drugs’ 
• ‘persistent young offenders’ 
• ‘business and retail crime’  
• ‘arson’.  
 (Home Office, 2004) 
 
Leaving aside the significant conjecture in claiming that CCTV has somehow been evaluated as 
a response to all of these issues with any methodological rigour (see inter alia Pawson and 
Tilley, 1994; Davies, 1996a; Short and Ditton, 1995; Tilley, 1998; Welsh and Farrington, 
2002; NACRO, 2002), not to mention the lack of awareness of any such evaluations amongst 
respondents, it is clear that CCTV is presented as effective in a wide range of applications. On 
a more general level, recent contradictory themes in government crime control policy – outlined 
by Garland (2001) as punitive drives based on cultures of insecurity and also rationalised 
managerial responses to crime – have been described as neatly serviced by CCTV (Sutton and 
Wilson, 2004). CCTV has also been identified as occupying a symbolic role where partnerships Fussey: An Interrupted Transmission? 
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can overcome struggles for legitimacy by demonstrating tangible responses to community fears 
(Fussey, 2005).  
 
However, the data also revealed an additional theme concerning the pre-active functionality of 
residential-space CCTV. Here the means of CCTV dissemination are as valuable as its 
perceived end. Like the legitimating and symbolic roles identified above, in this respect CCTV 
appears to fulfil a number of important functions before it is even switched on; functions 
characterised here as ‘presurveillance’. 
 
In the main, these preoperational functions of CCTV intersect with notions of community 
cohesion, transition and environmental improvements – all of which were key concerns for both 
partnerships. Two examples of how this may occur now follow: 
 
These sentiments were expressed across Metropolitan City where attempts were made to 
encourage commercial and service infrastructures to operate in particular areas (Interview 25), 
reduce population transience and help generate stability and cohesion in the community 
(Interviews 14, 21). Such aims clearly informed one proposed CCTV scheme as part of a 
regeneration project in one deprived non-central urban area, ‘Hall End’, whereby CCTV was 
part of an attempt to encourage local businesses and services into the area. Such pre-
operational application of CCTV again reflects on political–economic accounts, which have less 
to say about surveillance camera installations in residential areas. Although political–economic 
accounts have rightly pointed to the prominence of less than benign neo-liberal models of 
regeneration that reinforce structural inequalities and ‘manage out’ the urban poor (inter alia 
Bannister et al., 1998), this is not always the only effect in residential spaces. The ‘Hall End’ 
estate – positioned beyond the suburbs on the edge of Metropolitan City as part of the ‘urban 
leapfrog’ from inner-cities during the 1960s – had been all but abandoned of basic amenities 
such as local shops and laundrettes (along with one-third of properties lying vacant). Hence, the 
businesses focused upon were local and small-scale, rather than multi-nationals (who had exited 
the estate years before) concerned with attracting middle-class consumers. Indeed, outsiders 
rarely ventured on the estate without necessity and the nearest bus route skirted the area. 
Likewise, anecdotal evidence indicates that taxis also routinely refused to drive into the area. 
‘It’s not the place to go to. It’s a place to come from’, as the local Community Safety Officer 
puts it (Interview 25). Hence, rather than solely functioning to persecute particular sub-
populations to ‘improve’ consumer space, CCTV may be applied in an attempt to engender 
such forms of cohesion and stability. This signifies a potentially paradoxical role of CCTV 
implementation, which threatens urban diversity through the ‘sorting’ of social difference yet – 
by forming part of a s trategy to counter community transition and disorganisation through 
retention of community amenities  – simultaneously aims to ground disparate groups in a 
particular area. Similar to Lyon’s (1994) repressing and protecting ‘Janus-faces’ of surveillance, 
here CCTV operates in a simultaneously fragmenting and consolidating capacity. 
 
On a related theme, elsewhere in the city the process of acquiring CCTV for an area was seen 
by practitioners to have distinct benefits that were quite separate from its post-installation 
operations. Adding to the existing litany of its cited roles, one practitioner – responsible for co-
ordinating crime policy across a large area in the south of Metropolitan City and, more Fussey: An Interrupted Transmission? 
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importantly, compiling CCTV bids – felt that the ‘process of getting CCTV’ was ‘as much the 
positive thing as the actual CCTV itself’ (Interview 33a). Nevertheless, it was felt that engaging 
residents as part of the bidding process for CCTV would generate informal intra-community 
networks and, hence, enhance community cohesion, whilst also connecting community desires 
with the enabling policies of local authorities. Such perceived cohesive effects of community 
interaction also suggest connections with later Chicagoan ideas of ‘community efficacy’ (see 
Sampson et al., 1997). Hence, for practitioners, CCTV begins to provide a function through its 
very existence, whether as material installation or in a mooted form in more abstract decision-
making forums. In this manner, practitioners consider that CCTV fulfils a purpose before it is 
even installed. 
 
These symbolic features of CCTV raise a number of significant points of discussion. The first of 
these regards the potentially downgraded importance of CCTV effectiveness amongst other 
pressing obligations. Moreover, beyond sole issues of legitimacy, deeper, more ancillary 
‘presurveillant’ functions for CCTV denote the crucial function of public camera surveillance 
before it is switched on, in some cases before implementation and, intermittently, (concerning the 
installation of imitation cameras in one Industrial Town estate) whether switched on or not.7 On 
one level, this supplies an interesting caveat to McCahill’s (2002: 46) argument that ‘on its own 
CCTV technology does nothing’. Whilst this is almost certainly true in terms of its manifest 
operation and accurately reflects a question mark over its deterrent capacities; for practitioners 
at least, CCTV installation fulfils a number of presurveillant functions. However, despite 
practitioner belief in the effectiveness of such additional applications, there is presently little 
research to justify these claims. Moreover, while a number of commentaries on CCTV make 
valuable points regarding its operational function, often contained is an implication that these 
same conceptual  principles and processes inform its implementation. The evidence here, 
however, suggests that on their own, these perceived presurveillant benefits can be enough to 
stimulate CCTV expansion.8 Taking a cue from Norris and Armstrong’s (1998: 8) argument 
that CCTV needs to be understood critically as ‘a form of power with a number of dimensions’, 
presurveillance represents an additional and substantial face of CCTV functionality. 
 
Such latent utility may also set public CCTV schemes apart from other technological forms of 
surveillance and information gathering, such as biometric surveillance or ‘smart’ ID cards. In 
these latter modes, through their very existence the technology itself asserts a function by 
capturing data. With CCTV, such ‘capture’ is not necessarily assured. Thus, for CCTV, it is not 
necessarily the technology that does the work, but the contingent responses of surrounding 
actors.9  
                                                  
7 Other presurveillance functions can also be negative, as seen by the redoubled exclusionary impact of 
CCTV installation outlined below. 
8 This is not to suggest that perceived operational functions are absent from decisions to implement CCTV. 
They clearly can be present. Considerations over presurveillant and operational functioning are, therefore, 
by no means mutually exclusive. Thus, the point here is that CCTV implementation is not all about its 
operational functions (crime control or otherwise). Before this stage, from its inception, CCTV is deemed to 
be serving a purpose and this alone can be enough to drive its implementation. 
9 Whilst arguing that human responses to surveillance installations are paramount may suggest an 
undercurrent of acceptance for the panoptic model, a number of crucial differences exist. Primarily, the Fussey: An Interrupted Transmission? 
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Demands for surveillance 
 
Perceived public support 
 
Perhaps  the  key demand-orientated driver appears to be the strength of pro-surveillance 
discourse amongst the public. Across both partnerships practitioners commonly referred to the 
levels of public support for CCTV and the frequency with which it was requested. Although 
public support for CCTV is perhaps fairly unremarkable in itself, its significance lies in the way 
that policy structures convert demand into manifest strategies.10 Once the decision to implement 
CCTV is taken, the next step towards installation involves securing funding. Current funding 
arrangements stipulate that this can only be gained following a formal consultation with the local 
community. This return to communities signifies a ‘doubling-up’ impact of residential support for 
CCTV. Thus, first, the demand for CCTV originates from the community; after, it is used to 
drive the policy-process along. This indicates the significant and instrumental role of public 
support in determining whether CCTV is installed or not. 
 
Such levels of public support also reflect on a number of theoretical themes, specifically 
depictions of surveillance as a coercive tool of the malign state. Here, many of those requesting 
residential-space CCTV belong to those same disadvantaged groups who would be subject to 
such ‘coercion’. In Metropolitan City, for example, large levels of support for CCTV were 
evident in one of most disadvantaged estates in Britain. This suggests the need for such neo-
Marxist approaches to be reconsidered. One solution may be the incorporation of Gramsci’s 
(1971) notion of hegemony to explain how local communities accept government definitions of 
CCTV. Indeed, there are clear similarities between such community views on the applicability of 
CCTV and those outlined by the government (see Home Office, 1994). Moreover, government 
recommendations to maximise the potential deterrence effects of surveillance cameras through 
constant reinforcement of positive CCTV messages, wherever possible (ibid.), may compound 
this process. However, the negotiations and conflicts amongst local practitioners over the 
application of CCTV (see below) supplies an interesting caveat to the issue of how such 
hegemony, if it exists, is negotiated. 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
responses to technology are not characterised in terms of discipline. The focus is less on those individuals 
actually under surveillance, and more on the actors responsible for, or those who may benefit from, CCTV 
installation. These include local politicians seeking credibility, partnerships gaining legitimacy, attempts to 
grant communities infrastructure and cohesion and residents requesting alleviation from fear. Sometimes the 
cameras do not necessarily need to exist where the idea of potential CCTV installation may be sufficient in 
achieving these goals. Foucauldian disciplinary normalisation is thus a separate issue and, given the 
reduced emphasis on effectiveness, possibly one of lesser importance. 
10 Although a level of caution is required when considering claims of public support for CCTV. As Ditton 
(1998) argues, methodological flaws, such as the use of leading questions in quantitative questionnaires, 
can lead to extremely diverse results. Similar poor methodological practices were evident in one Industrial 
Town consultation where residents were sent a ‘public consultation proforma’ which asked the leading 
question of ‘I would support the installation of two CCTV cameras: Yes or No’. Indeed, this is not really a 
question at all, but a statement of intent worded in such a way as to invite acceptance on the part of the 
respondent. Fussey: An Interrupted Transmission? 
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However, because practitioners only seek consent for CCTV installations amongst certain well-
placed groups, wider hegemonic negotiation is neither secured nor necessary. Specifically, 
limitations on practitioners’ time resources mean that they certain parts of the bidding process 
become abridged, by which the main casualty of this is adequate community consultation. As a 
result, the views of particular ‘vocal groups’, such as those who attend council consultation 
meetings, are amplified and attributed greater significance. As a corollary, the so-called ‘hard-
to-reach’ groups – populated by young people, particular ethnic minorities and gay and lesbian 
demographics  – are most likely to become excluded from consultation exercises. Thus, the 
specific functioning of the policy context renders genuine democratic consultation less important 
than it initially appears.11  Moreover, t his ‘over-consultation’ of empowered groups both 
supports arguments proposing that dominant groups in society are favoured in crime-control 
policy (inter alia, Boddy, 1992; Gilling, 1999) and ensures that those most likely to be the 
subject of surveillance-based social sorting (see inter alia Norris and Armstrong, 1999) are 
least likely to be involved in decisions over its implementation. This process of policy 
implementation therefore amplifies the exclusionary potential of CCTV. 
 
Police endorsements 
 
Another demand driver is the substantial police support for CCTV. Because partnership 
structures elevate the influence of police agency over others and owing to their unique role in 
disseminating crime-control ‘expertise’ (see Ericson and Haggerty, 1997), this support is 
significant and influential. More than being seen as a useful tool amongst many when tackling 
crime, CCTV is considered a premium strategy. In Metropolitan City, for example, the Police 
Community Safety Officer explained that when having to allocate resources to a particular 
strategy, CCTV is preferred over other measures including increased numbers of police officers. 
Such a preference is significant and raises an additional theoretical point concerning the 
disappearance of the individual through surveillance practices. Where Lyon (2001) notes the 
disappearance of the subject of surveillance through the abstraction of particular traits and 
measurable phenomena, here a desire for more remote (also considered as more efficient) forms 
of interaction with the subject of control is apparent through the substitution of police officers for 
distanciated surveillance. 
 
So far, the above discussions suggest a process of CCTV implementation where practitioners’ 
influence is compressed amid simultaneous demand pressures from below (involving calls for 
more cameras) and the supply forces (of resources, policy leads and ‘solutions’ to crime 
problems) from above. However, this paper argues that this does not lead to a simple translation 
into CCTV installation. Instead, such f orces are filtered through, and consequently mediated 
within, crime reduction partnerships comprising of responsibilised actors, some of whom are 
ultimately the final arbiters over whether CCTV becomes installed or not. Moreover, this 
                                                  
11 As it stands, the government does not demand a detailed explanation of how consultations were carried 
out. For example, the Industrial Town partnership gained successful funding for a new CCTV installation 
with the following cursory reference to consultation in their bid document: ‘99% of respondents were in 
favour. A copy of the letter and some responses are enclosed’. Clearly, allowing (and rewarding) such 
practices represents an area where the Home Office could be stricter and thus help generate more robust 
local democratic structures. Fussey: An Interrupted Transmission? 
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endorsement of CCTV is not necessarily shared by all practitioners and significant contestation 
within partnerships over the value CCTV interrupts the transmission of surveillance policy 
between its conception and its application. This paper now turns towards an analysis of the 
space in which such discord is articulated and negotiated. 
 
 
Negotiated Surveillance 
 
The above discussion has demonstrated how CCTV dissemination often does not occur as an 
objective solution to identified problems and is instead mediated by forces of demand and 
supply. Thus, combinations of fluid arrangements and extraneous factors have a greater impact 
on whether CCTV is installed than is recognised in many practical and theoretical accounts of 
surveillance. Rather than practitioners passively carrying out pre-ordained rationalist agendas or 
succumbing to fixations over technology, these contested sites are the forums through which 
CCTV policy becomes transmitted. Moreover, as the following discussion demonstrates, 
significant contestation over CCTV exists throughout both partnerships, which needs to reach 
some form of resolution – whether by consensus, negotiation or otherwise – for the cameras to 
be installed. In effect, this represents a significant interruption in the transmission of CCTV 
policies from proposal to practice. Here, it is also important to note some of the issues that 
prevent and forestall the implementation CCTV. 
 
Analysis of the levels of practitioner’s support for CCTV reveals a complex and sometimes 
conflicting set of issues. Generally speaking, most practitioners articulated some reservations 
over CCTV, an issue which challenges assumptions that practitioners view CCTV as a panacea 
(inter alia Davies, 1996b). This raises an additional set of questions concerning if and how 
these reservations become mobilised and articulated. Another question concerns whether, in 
spite of acknowledged drawbacks to camera surveillance, practitioners proceed with the 
implementation of CCTV as either a kind of ‘bad faith’, or succumb to other driving pressures. 
Both of these discussions are developed below. First, however, is a brief examination of the 
form in which these reservations take. 
 
One finding of note here is how objections to CCTV based on civil liberties and intrusion, whilst 
present, were not significantly replayed in these partnerships. Instead, contestations over CCTV 
were overwhelmingly centred on issues of effectiveness.12 However, practitioners did not just 
disagree over the effectiveness of CCTV, but also why it is ineffective.  
 
                                                  
12 Nevertheless, ambiguity surrounding human rights legislation did forestall one potential CCTV scheme 
aimed at targeting burglary suspects in Metropolitan City. Instead, funds were diverted towards strategies 
aimed at ‘designing out’ burglary. This tabled CCTV strategy was substituted, not over concerns for 
preserving the rights of the surveilled, but to ensure the police were protected against litigation. In addition 
to underlining the position of practitioners as final arbiters over the installation of this surveillance system, 
this policy choice suggests a preferred deployment of cameras for broader, indiscriminate surveillance 
practices rather than more subject-orientated monitoring. However, when talking about surveillance 
generally, it is in the latter application where many commentators feel the most effective function of CCTV 
lies (Innes, 2003; Lyon, 2004b). Fussey: An Interrupted Transmission? 
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Of these issues, displacement was commonly cited as a limitation of CCTV. Within this 
category, practitioners were only concerned with the spatial displacement of crime, rather than 
other forms, such as the tactical displacement of crime type (see inter alia Felson and Clarke, 
1998). Although spatial displacement was a concern for many, the infusion of managerialist 
procedures into local crime control decision-making meant this was not a concern for all. 
Indeed, abstract borders imposed by localised managerial performance indicators left one senior 
practitioner (responsible for crime reduction in a southern district of Metropolitan City) happy 
for CCTV to displace crime, provided that it was away from his area of responsibility. Clearly, 
such  attitudes from those with an instrumental role in installing CCTV generate a range of 
important issues. These include potential inter-agency conflict over the installation of such 
schemes in adjacent areas; the possibility of a downgraded emphasis on reducing crime and 
social harm across large urban geographies; and the potential for discord between local and 
regional goals. Either way, not only do such attitudes counter practitioners’ claims of ‘joined-up 
thinking’, but also reveal some rather spurious reasons for wishing to install CCTV. 
 
Other debates over effectiveness concerned image reproduction and the ‘perfection’ of 
surveillance. Metropolitan City was one of the first cities in the UK to install a comprehensive 
CCTV system  (CCTV was first installed in Metropolitan City in 1988, with a major upgrade 
during 1991). As a result, much of the hardware has become outdated and superseded by more 
advanced technology. This was not lost on practitioners, among whom recognition of 
technological improvements in camera surveillance has  stimulated renewed aspirations for 
updated systems and an awareness of the limitations of existing facilities.13 Such drives towards 
continual improvement of surveillance provisions partially reflect on Bogard’s (1996) 
Baudrillardian descriptions of perfecting surveillance. Yet in Metropolitan City this occurs in a 
more grounded sense regarding the instruments of image capture rather than the perfecting of 
simulation processes. This goal of updating surveillance systems in response to inadequately 
reproduced images raises an interesting point concerning shifting perceptions of technological 
capabilities. At the time of installation, could these images, now considered distorted, have been 
seen with clarity? Certainly, the quality was deemed adequate for the strategy to be rolled out 
across large parts of the city. Part of the explanation may lie in the perceived innovative nature 
of the approach during an era of ‘nothing works’ and ever-spiralling crime rates (coupled with a 
‘common sense’ logic of CCTV effectiveness that narrows objections). These factors suggest 
the possibility of technological and surveillance discourses specific to the period of initial 
implementation which, in light of the current myriad supply and demand influences impacting on 
CCTV implementation, may no longer fully apply. Nevertheless, the increasing growth of 
surveillance, despite its untested nature, is a familiar story and one currently replayed in 
Metropolitan City. 
 
After displacement issues, the next frequently cited drawback of CCTV concerned fallibilities in 
the ‘response network’ surrounding surveillance cameras. This network is defined here as the 
process that intercedes between an event occurring before a camera and subsequent action, 
                                                  
13 Rather than pressure from the security industry for increased and improved surveillance apparatus (as 
argued by Graham, 1998), this data identifies demand as generated within the partnership in recognition of 
the limitations of the older earlier systems. Fussey: An Interrupted Transmission? 
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whether this represents deployment of enforcement agents or later evidential use of images. 
Hence, the response network incorporates fallibilities of operators, agencies charged with 
responding to incidents detected on CCTV and breached integrity of information garnered from 
CCTV.  
 
One such issue related to concern amongst senior practitioners that incidents spotted on camera 
are effectively followed up by enforcement agencies. Two key themes arise from this concern. 
Firstly, CCTV does not necessarily ensure an active response from associated enforcement 
agencies (as Norris and Armstrong (1999) and McCahill (2002) demonstrate).14 This supplies 
a caveat to the strength of CCTV as deterrence. Like its classicist underpinnings, deterrent 
effects recede without swift and consistent reinforcement of punitive capabilities. This may add 
some explanation to Tilley’s (1993) identification of the limited longevity of CCTV schemes. 
These issues suggest that any deterrent effect of CCTV may be enhanced through its location 
within a suitably responsive network. 
 
Senior members of the Metropolitan City partnership also adjudged technological efficacy as 
contingent on human interventions, particularly with reference to the problems of identifying 
individuals from live and recorded footage. Such difficulties in capturing an image during or after 
its occurrence suggest that post-surveillance interpretations and modulations – of the kinds 
outlined by Deleuze (1995) and adherents such as Haggerty and Ericson (2000) – can become 
difficult to achieve. Although previously  identified moves to update CCTV systems in 
Metropolitan City may enable greater facilitation of this task, more intractable human frailties still 
interrupt the conveyance of the surveilled image. 
 
Aside from these fallibilities concerning the human linkages in punitive and surveillance networks, 
one of the most striking research findings concerns the unawareness of the police of a public 
CCTV scheme in an inner-city area of Metropolitan City: 
 
There was CCTV set up in one of the estates. I didn’t even know it was there 
for nearly five years. The people who are paid to monitor it, it was in 
[location]… The quality of the cameras was very poor; the product from the 
cameras was very poor so it just fell into disuse  
(Interview 35). 
 
This demonstrates the extent of fragmented network arrangements surrounding surveillance. 
Hence, forces other than those seen to pull ‘surveillant assemblages’ together (Haggerty and 
Ericson, 2000) are in evidence. Instead, the abandonment of this system suggests a form of 
atrophy within surveillance networks. In addition, lack of awareness over the existence of public 
CCTV systems may undermine assurances that civil liberties concerns are being observed. 
 
Interpreting discord over CCTV 
 
                                                  
14 Indeed, as Norris and Armstrong (1999) show, CCTV surveillance rarely catalyses deployment, sometimes 
even when actual crimes are being observed. Fussey: An Interrupted Transmission? 
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Amongst practitioners, then, discourses of CCTV appear contested. Despite reservations, 
however, CCTV installations were not necessarily rejected outright and continued to be 
implemented. In a number of cases, individuals either doubted or were indifferent to the 
capabilities of CCTV, yet  still undertook action that was instrumental in securing its 
installation.  This is illustrated in two examples, one from each partnership.  
 
In Industrial Town, a central figure in the process of requesting CCTV for a residential area to 
tackle crime and disorder earlier asserted that the cameras do not stop ‘real crime’, ‘won't stop 
the basic problem’, that ‘there's a real question mark over them’ and, in reference to burglary, ‘I 
don't think CCTV would make any difference whatsoever’ (Interview 3). In Metropolitan City, 
CCTV installation was also pursued despite uncertainty over its potential effectiveness. When 
asked about the effectiveness of CCTV, an Area Co-ordinator for a southern area of city, 
heavily involved in mobilising local support and compiling – by her own admission, elaborate – 
bids for Home Office CCTV funding in the area, said ‘it’s not something I know a great deal 
about  …  There’s been no proper research done on the findings really, believe it or not 
(Interview 33a). Thus effective CCTV applications are not always considered a prerequisite for 
its installation. 
 
Both of these examples demonstrate attempts to implement CCTV by practitioners harbouring 
either scepticism or indifference over its likely effectiveness. On this evidence there may be an 
argument that practitioners are acting in ‘bad faith’15 in their attempts to install CCTV. Certainly, 
the recurring theme of scant regard for evaluation, and hence compromised rationality, is 
present. However, one can argue that particular reasons can help understand why effectiveness 
appears to be downgraded amongst other demands.  
 
What emerges most strongly in this body of data is how situational and contextual factors exert 
pressures which skew decision-making towards CCTV deployment and serve to ‘paper over’ 
deeper conflicts. Such pressures specifically concern the way in which policy is made. This may 
include a number of issues including differential partnership stratification; pressure to cultivate 
legitimacy; available expertise or capacity to implement alternatives; the existence of earmarked 
funding; pressure from the sections of communities consulted; and agents’ acquiescence to 
existing partnership consensus over key policy orientations. A ll of these may combine to 
stimulate the implementation of CCTV. Hence policy arrangements may result in objections to 
CCTV being overcome in a trade-off of individual agency in order to achieve wider 
organisational and strategic goals. These goals may also stretch beyond controlling crime and 
incorporate the aims of enhancing credibility and securing partnership stability, and thus also 
underlines the importance of the ‘presurveillant’ functions of CCTV highlighted earlier.  
 
Additionally, resolute public demands harnessed by the policy process (and political agents) can 
pressure practitioners into action; an issue that operates in isolation from debates over 
effectiveness. This was clearly demonstrated in the above example of the practitioner’s 
indifference to the capabilities of CCTV whilst in the process of compiling a bid for Home 
Office funding (Interview 33a). Thus, a clear distinction over the enthusiasm for CCTV is 
                                                  
15 See Cohen (2001) for a comprehensive discussion on the concept of action in ‘bad faith’. Fussey: An Interrupted Transmission? 
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apparent between practitioners and amongst those sections of the community where consent 
was sought. Moreover, this demonstrates how obligations imposed by the policy context may 
affect CCTV dissemination, where public wishes for technological surveillance, whilst not 
necessarily shared by practitioners, become mobilised and transmitted through the contextual 
arrangements in which they are filtered. Hence, the process of implementation itself becomes 
instrumental to the dissemination of CCTV. 
 
In the broader setting, other forms of conflict resolution can also influence decisions over CCTV 
deployment. For example, conflicts may be resolved where powerful members reassert their 
authority, thus fortifying the initial conditions that emphasise enforcement and surveillance 
‘solutions’ to problems of crime and disorder. One such example is the statement by the senior 
police representative – a central figure in the Metropolitan City partnership – that there was ‘no 
point sitting down with individuals’ he had ‘no control over’ (Interview 35). Thus, partnership 
negotiations over CCTV can generate powerful coalitions of consensus to drive the process 
along in particular directions, therefore conflicting with public claims of democratised and 
inclusive approaches towards strategic development. Hence, whilst continuing CCTV expansion 
may give an impression of unequivocal practitioner consensus over its benefits, it masks the 
significant negotiations and tensions that simmer beneath.  Ultimately,  this discussion 
demonstrates how public CCTV dissemination can be a product of conflict, not of consensus.  
 
Discord and corporate interest-based surveillance 
 
The research also identified significant disagreements within commercial spheres over CCTV 
installation. Whilst many political-economic accounts offer valuable observations regarding 
corporate agendas and public surveillance, the data suggests an additional dimension to these 
relations. This particularly concerns a disharmony between these actors which suggests that 
commercial values are not necessarily transmitted into CCTV implementation.  
 
In the first instance, commercial decisions over surveillance may also become subject to 
corporate logics of profit and loss. This issue was clearly articulated by a representative of 
Metropolitan City’s chamber of commerce: ‘as a Chamber, we feel there are more effective 
ways of dealing with crime because CCTV cameras are very expensive’ (Interview 16).16 
Closer examination of this theme suggests that, despite initial support for the cameras, 
enthusiasm significantly declined once businesses were required to pay for its management. 
Here, the applications of commercial values can be seen to work against installations. One way 
this happens concerns the tension between raising money for capital and then ensuring that the 
running costs can be met (under current Home Office funding arrangements, the government 
requires the latter to be provided locally). Both partnerships experienced problems where 
capital costs were secured from the government but local traders, despite earlier assurances, 
                                                  
16 When pressed on what these ‘better ways of dealing with a problem’ were, this participant cited low-tech 
surveillance solutions relying on the observations of human agents, such as community ‘ring-round’ 
schemes. Fussey: An Interrupted Transmission? 
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were unwilling to contribute towards the running costs, causing the government to withdraw its 
initial funding.17  
 
This occurred in both partnerships during the period of research. In Industrial Town, for 
example, one successful bid of £187,000 for significant CCTV expansion (boosting the number 
of the town’s cameras by a fifth) collapsed at the implementation stage for this reason. Local 
businesses reneged on their written commitments (included in the bid document) to contribute 
£1,500 each per annum towards the running costs of the scheme. Similarly, one local 
practitioner describes the shifting perspectives of local traders in one area of Metropolitan City 
after initially asking for CCTV to be installed: 
 
traders were loathe to take responsibility for paying revenue costs. It worked 
out at about ten pounds per week per trader. And the traders said ‘What’s the 
point? The cameras will be useful in picking up fighting in the streets at night but 
we are already shut by then and, to be honest, having shutters on our shop is a 
better deterrent for us than cameras on the streets’. So there have been a couple 
of failed attempts in Metropolitan City to set up CCTV.  
(Interview 22) 18 
 
Such variations in support for CCTV, conditional on external investment, indicate that desires 
for surveillance often only run as deep as financial prudence allows. Moreover, were state 
funding extended to cover operational management of the cameras, we would undoubtedly see 
even more CCTV cameras on the streets of England and Wales. 
 
Considering the final implementation of CCTV, clearly much depends on both the political will 
and available resources within local authorities at that time and in that location. Earlier instances 
of such corporate equivocation, for example, had led the Metropolitan City Council to shoulder 
the deficit of managerial costs to rescue the installation which, as a corollary, amplified the 
reticence of other businesses to support CCTV management throughout the city. Whilst this 
data confirms Fyfe and Bannister’s (1996) contention that public and private partnerships are 
fraught with potential tensions, their explanation, that this is because local councils are reluctant 
to commit public funds to projects serving commercial interests, can be reconsidered. Instead of 
corporate interests lobbying reluctant councils for CCTV implementation, contestations over 
CCTV were played out between and within commercial and council bodies.19 Moreover, 
because the council committed public funds to schemes once businesses have been unwilling to 
pay and because this took place in a largely residential area where (sections of) the public were 
                                                  
17 The collapse of these bids may also undermine trust in the partnership, once CCTV has been promised. 
Practitioners also acknowledge the undermining of such trust as a major cause of fear of crime. Thus 
potentially contributing to the problem that CCTV installation was originally intended to tackle. 
18 Interview 22 was conducted with a representative of the probation service who had been seconded to 
work at a senior level within the Metropolitan City partnership. 
19 This is not to suggest that CCTV implementation involves constant struggles between commercial and 
council entities; merely that contestation can and does exist. 
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mobilised in their demands for CCTV, the differential surveillance contexts of residential and 
commercial spaces are underlined. 
 
However, commercial support for CCTV may also be discordant within itself depending on the 
configuration of businesses in urban spaces. For example, a different estate in Metropolitan City 
experienced significant conflict arose owing to smaller traders’ anger that larger businesses (such 
as banks and multinationals) were not investing significantly more towards the management costs 
of CCTV. Hence, rather than the transmission of a homogenous set of corporate values into 
manifest CCTV installation, significant disagreement is in evidence. It may also be possible that 
such conflict and exacerbated feelings of injustice could reduce the likelihood of CCTV 
installation.  
 
Overall, such shifting and discordant relations between local authorities and commercial 
interests, alongside the evidence of intra-commercial rivalry, indicate a greater complexity of 
corporate involvement and a more splintered set of values than many political-economic 
accounts suggest ( inter alia  Williams  et al., 2000). This locational specificity of CCTV 
implementation also points to the difficulties of presenting political and economic influences as 
necessarily coterminous when conceptualising CCTV dissemination across whole urban 
geographies. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Overall, this paper has demonstrated how a number of contextual and circumstantial forces – 
such as supply, demand and negotiations within stratified partnerships  – intersect and are 
harnessed by specific policy-making arrangements to generate stimulus for CCTV expansion. 
Together, these factors constitute the process that motivates the implementation of CCTV into 
practice. In doing so, the messy and interrupted transmission of surveillance policy from 
conception to material implementation reveals myriad influences of agency and structure that 
shape CCTV diffusion. Regarding influences of agency, responsibilised practitioners assert a 
decisive influence upon both the manifestation and spatial positioning of camera installations. In 
such respects, these agents are the final arbiters of CCTV diffusion. 
 
However, such assertions of agency do not function in an unfettered (and constructivist) manner. 
Rather, an identifiable structural, conceptual and material environment enables and constrains the 
way in which such actions operate. Within these environments, practitioners responsible for 
implementing CCTV need to mediate the demands of an empowered section of the public; 
commit to servicing local democracy; generate their own legitimacy; engage in intra-partnership 
disputes and struggles for ascendancy; and respond to a policy context orientated around 
increasing surveillance techniques. Limited managerial resources and opportunities for reflexivity 
within stratified partnerships also cultivate heavy emphasis on responsive and enforcement-
based approaches. Coupled with this, for practitioners, CCTV also fulfils a number of crucial 
‘presurveillant’ functions. Taken cumulatively, the policy end of CCTV implementation reflects 
the process means that bring it into existence. 
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This identification of such crucial assertions of agency and structure upon the development and 
transmission of CCTV policy also creates space f or the application of different theoretical 
positions to understand its deployment. In particular, further research could draw on integrative 
sociological theories in an attempt to gain a more detailed sense of how agency and structure 
both interrelate and mutually construct one another in relation to CCTV dissemination. Although 
currently an underdeveloped area in the field of criminology (with a few exceptions, inter alia 
Bottoms and Wiles, 1992; also see Vaughan, 2001), future analysis could draw on integrative 
frameworks such as those developed in Giddens’ (1984) ‘structuration theory’ or Bourdieu’s 
(1994) conceptualisation of ‘habitus’ and ‘field’.  
 
Overall, the pre-operational dissemination of CCTV is, therefore, neither necessarily utopian nor 
dystopian in nature, but rather hostage to these impositions of agency and structure. Whilst some 
theoretical commentaries have acknowledged deeper contestations and forces surrounding 
CCTV expansion, this paper has both drawn attention and contributed detail to the nature of 
these interactions and how they affect the formulation of CCTV strategies in its material and 
conceptual settings. In the process of such analysis, the transmission of surveillance has been 
characterised as a messy and irregular process subject to myriad influences, thus augmenting 
citations of coherent or singular organising principles explaining its expansion. Because CCTV 
fulfils multiple roles, it cannot be coalesced into any single agenda; materialistic, political or 
otherwise. Taken cumulatively, the processes behind the expansion of camera surveillance are 
diffused through complex interactions of structure and agency which are, in turn, filtered through 
contingent and shifting policy arrangements. 
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